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THE FLAWS OF RATIONAL BASIS WITH BITE:
WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD
ACKNOWLEDGE ITS APPLICATION OF
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY TO
CLASSIFICATIONS BASED ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION
Jeremy B. Smith*
"I wonder who it was defined man as a rational animal. It was the
most premature definition ever given."' 1
INTRODUCTION

After harsh losses regarding the rights of gay men and lesbians to
marry in the November 2004 election, proponents of gay rights have
begun to contemplate the adoption of a more incremental approach to
full marriage rights that would involve securing the component rights
of marriage, such as survivor benefits, hospital visitation privileges,2
and tax breaks for gay couples, rather than the right to marry itself.
As this debate evolves and continues to permeate our society and our
courts, the importance of solid and minimally contestable equal
protection jurisprudence in attempts to deal with classifications based
on sexual orientation has never been greater. Inherently, this will
have consequences for how the rights of gay men and lesbians to
marry will be handled.3 More importantly, it can serve as a reminder
that our Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens" 4 as gay men and lesbians seek equality, right by right, with
their heterosexual neighbors.

* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Elizabeth Cooper for her insight and guidance in the writing of this Note.
1. Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, in Collected Works of Oscar Wilde
1, 23 (1997).
2. See John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on Gay Rights, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 9, 2004, at Al; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D. Hunter,
Sexuality, Gender and the Law 297 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that "short-term modest
advances followed by good or neutral consequences for the community enable larger
advances in the long term").
3. See infra Parts II.B-II.C.
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Traditionally, only a few classifications have merited heightened
scrutiny5 -most notably gender and race classifications. Despite their
ostensible qualification for heightened scrutiny based on criteria set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court,6 gay men and lesbians have not yet
been treated as a suspect class and thus classifications based on sexual
orientation have been historically subject to rational basis review.7
The Supreme Court's decisions in Romer v. Evans8 and Lawrence v.
Texas9 have added only new confusion to the treatment of sexual
orientation classifications under the Equal Protection Clause. This
Note analyzes how both federal and state courts have dealt with such
classifications in their equal protection analysis in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Romer and Lawrence.
This Note suggests that the Romer and Lawrence decisions imply
that the Supreme Court not only ought to make gay men and lesbians
a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but that it has in practice already done
so, albeit without the sufficient binding force of precedent. This Note
argues that an acknowledgment by the Court of its use of a more
searching form of rational basis review-a type of heightened
scrutiny-for sexual orientation classifications as used in Romer and
Lawrence will resolve the two unintended consequences of those
cases. First, the Supreme Court's failure to articulate its more
searching form of rational1 basis review, or what has been called
"rational basis with bite," used in Romer, Lawrence, and other
related opinions, has led to inconsistent judgments in the federal court
system as lower courts remain reluctant to veer from traditional
deferential review.1 ' Second, by acknowledging use of a form of
heightened scrutiny, judicial opinions regarding sexual orientation
classifications will no longer be as susceptible to criticisms that such
opinions are unwarranted examples of judicial activism that defy
constitutional precedent in dealing with non-suspect classifications.12
Part I of this Note articulates the basic formulations of equal
protection jurisprudence, outlines the Supreme Court's opinions in
Romer and Lawrence, and provides a brief overview of pre-Romer

5. This Note uses the phrase "heightened scrutiny" to refer to any level of
judicial scrutiny that is more searching than rational basis review, rather than to either
intermediate or strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation,
Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 237 (1996). For further
discussion, see infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part I.A.2.
7. Eskridge & Hunter, supra note 2, at 242; see also infra notes 69-73 and
accompanying text.
8. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
9. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
10. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by
Any Other Name, 62 Ind. L.J. 779, 780 (1987).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.C.

2005]

RATIONAL BASIS WITH BITE

2771

federal case law dealing with sexual orientation classifications.13 Part
II illustrates the inconsistent application of rational basis review to
sexual orientation classifications in the federal court system and select
state courts which have significantly addressed the issue. 4 Part III
proposes that the solution to providing legitimate and consistent equal
protection jurisprudence, as applied to homosexuals, lies in not only
applying some form of heightened scrutiny to such classifications, but
also in explicitly acknowledging its application.15
I. BACKGROUND
This part examines the nature and criteria of suspect class
determinations under the Equal Protection Clause in general and then
delineates the historical treatment of sexual orientation classifications
prior to Romer, followed by a discussion of the Court's opinions in
Romer and Lawrence, respectively.
A. Suspect ClassificationsUnder Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."' 6 Equal protection requires that "all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike," 7 as the
Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."18
A court should apply some level of heightened scrutiny under equal
protection where there is reason to suspect "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities.., which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to

13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III. The conclusions of Part III embrace the reasoning of Judge
Dooley in his concurrence in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 889-97 (Vt. 1999) (Dooley,
J., concurring), which paved the way for civil unions in Vermont, and the reasoning
employed by the Washington State Superior Court in Castle v. State, No. 04-2-006144, 2004 WL 1985215, at *1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2004), which invalidated that
state's Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA").
16. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. It should be noted that the equal protection arm
of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. V, applies to the federal government
under the same framework as the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states. See
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) ("This Court's approach to
Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to
equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (stating that "it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government" than on state governments
to protect certain forms of unequal treatment).
17. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (citation omitted).
18. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This Note
will not address the other arm of equal protection analysis that determines whether a
classification burdens a fundamental right rather than a suspect class. See, e.g.,
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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protect minorities."19 This presumes that classifications which burden
some despised or politically powerless groups are likely to reflect
antipathy against such groups and that such classifications are
inherently suspect and must be strictly scrutinized. 2' As John Hart Ely
recognized, "the doctrine of suspect classifications is a roundabout
way of uncovering official attempts to inflict inequality for its own
sake-to treat a group worse not in the service of some overriding
social goal'21but largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its
members.

1. The Traditional Three Tiers of Review
Conventional equal protection analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment employs three tiers of judicial review based upon the
nature of the right or the class affected.22 If a classification implicates
a suspect class, the classification is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring
that the state demonstrate that the classification furthers a compelling
governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to further that
interest.23
Classifications based on race,24 national origin and
19. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). One
scholar has described the disadvantage in the political bargaining process faced by
such minorities as "empathy failure," which is "the group's inability to make its claims
sympathetic to potential bargaining partners." Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The
Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 Colum. L. Rev 1753, 1764-65
(1996). Where empathy failure arises, courts have the obligation to "intervene and
correct the political process." Id. at 1765.
20. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14. Unlike the Due Process Clause, which
exists primarily to safeguard traditional practices against "novel developments
brought about by temporary majorities who are insufficiently sensitive to the claims
of history," the Equal Protection Clause "has been understood as an attempt to
protect disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however deeply
engrained and longstanding.... [T]he Equal Protection Clause looks forward, serving
to invalidate practices that were widespread at the time of its ratification and that
were expected to endure." Cass R. Sunstein. Sexual Orientation and the Constitution:
A Note on the Relationship Between Due Processand Eaual Protection. 55 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1161. 1163 (1988). Though it is bevond the scope of this Note, Sunstein also
notes that "statutes that are unaffected bv the Due Process Clause may be drawn into
severe doubt by principles of equal protection." Id. at 1164.
21. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S.Cal. L. Rev. 481, 502-03
(2004) (quoting John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review 153 (1980)).
22. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985)
(outlining the Court's three tiers of equal protection analysis); see also infra Part
I.A.2. For a critique of the traditional tiered framework and the doctrine of suspect
classification, see Goldberg, supra note 21, proposing a single standard of review
under equal protection.
23. See Cleburne,473 U.S. at 440.
24. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964). Though originally a response to racial issues, some have
argued that the enacting Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to
classifications other than race. See, e.g., Nina Morais, Note, Sex Discriminationand
the FourteenthAmendment: Lost History, 97 Yale L.J. 1153 (1988).
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ethnicity, 25 and alienage 6 have been treated as suspect. The Supreme
Court has created a middle tier of review for classifications based on
gender or illegitimacy 28 commonly referred to as intermediate
scrutiny. Classifications affecting such quasi-suspect groups must be
substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental
interest.2 ' All other classifications are reviewed under the rational
basis test, under which they are presumptively constitutional as long
as they are rationally related to any conceivable, legitimate
governmental interest, even if such interest is offered post hoc. 30
The rational basis test in its traditional form is extremely deferential
to any proffered governmental interest.3 1 As the Supreme Court has
noted, a classification "must be upheld against equal protection
challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification. 32 Under rational
basis review, courts are constrained to accept a legislature's
generalizations even in the presence of an imperfect fit between
means and ends.33 Rational basis review "is not a license for courts to
judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices." 34
Moreover, the party challenging the legislation bears the burden of
25. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
26. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-23 (1982); Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365,371-72 (1971).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
688 (1973) (plurality opinion).
28. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68, 72 (1968).
29. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,441 (1985).
30. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (holding that a
restructured retirement system denying windfall benefits to certain employees while
permitting them for others was rationally related to maintaining system); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974) (holding that a state disability insurance program's
policy of excluding coverage of disabilities resulting from pregnancy was rationally
related to interest in maintaining self-supporting system); Williamson v. Lee Optical
of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (upholding statute prohibiting opticians from
fitting lenses without a prescription, though seemingly a needless and wasteful
requirement, as a valid exercise of legislature's discretion to treat one aspect of a field
differently from others for consumer protection); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (holding that potential traffic hazards justified an
exemption of vehicles advertising the owner's products from general advertising ban);
see also Cleburne,473 U.S. at 440.
31. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
32. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
33. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) (upholding a lower standard of proof
in commitment proceedings for the mentally retarded than for the mentally ill though
"[L]egislatures are
the distinctions between such groups may be imperfect).
presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in
practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (citations omitted).
34. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313.

2774

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

negating every conceivable rational basis for the classification,
regardless of whether or not such a rationale-or any at all-was
actually relied upon by the relevant authority.35
In addition to the three tiers outlined above, an additional category
of equal protection called "rational basis with bite" has developed,
though it remains ill defined.36 Under rational basis with bite, a court,
"while purporting to use the rational basis test, actually applies some
form of heightened scrutiny and invalidates the challenged law after a
close examination of the law's purpose and effects."37 Rational basis
with bite has been applied primarily, if not exclusively, in cases where
the classification at issue inappropriately discriminated against a
particular minority and the government's asserted interests had no
rational relationship to that discrimination.38 As Justice O'Connor
noted, "rw]hen a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically
unpopular group, [the Court has] applied a more searching form of
rational basis review
to strike down such laws under the Equal
39
Protection Clause.
2. The Test for Heightened Scrutiny
Although the Supreme Court has espoused a three-part test to
determine what classifications warrant traditional heightened scrutiny,
such determinations have proven more complex in practice than
simply analyzing these three elements.4" The test, elicited in Bowen v.
4 1 allows heightened
Gilliard,
scrutiny when a person (1) has suffered a
history of discrimination; (2) exhibits obvious, immutable or
distinguishing characteristics that define him as a member of a
discrete group; and (3) shows that the group is politically powerless or
a minority, or the statutory classification at issue burdens a
fundamental right.42

35. Id. at 313-15.
36. Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection After Romer v. Evans: Implications
for the Defense of MarriageAct and Other Laws, 49 Hastings L.J. 175, 180 (1997); see
Pettinga, supra note 10, at 779-80.
37. Lewis, supra note 36, at 180.
38. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450
(1985) (finding ordinance requiring the mentally retarded to acquire special permit
for group home based on irrational prejudice); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 543 (1973) (finding provision of Food Stamp Act requiring household
members to be related so as to prevent participation in the program by "hippies" did
not operate to rationally further the prevention of fraud).
39. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
40. See infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
41. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
42. Id. at 602-03; see Eric A. Roberts, Heightened Scrutiny Under the Equal
Protection Clause: A Remedy to Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 42
Drake L. Rev. 485, 496-97 (1993) (arguing that sexual orientation classifications merit
heightened scrutiny under the Supreme Court's three-part test in Bowen).
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In practice, the Supreme Court's holdings indicate that heightened
scrutiny has two essential elements and two buttressing factors that
may be used if relevant to the particular class in question.43 The first
essential element is that the classification must be unrelated to a
person's ability to contribute to society' as such laws are likely to
"reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened
class are not as worthy or deserving as others," 5 or "reflect outmoded
notions of the relative capabilities" of those who possess such
characteristics.46 The lack of a relationship between a law and the
characteristic against which it discriminates indicates that the law is
not a result of "legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate
objective," but rather a reflection of "deep-seated prejudice."47
The second essential element is that the group disfavored by the
classification must have experienced a history of intentional
discrimination.4 8 A complainant must demonstrate a history of
intentional, invidious discrimination against the group of which he is a
member because of the characteristic at issue.49 For example, with
regard to sex discrimination, the Supreme Court noted the nation's50
"long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" against women.
Age classifications, in contrast, do not merit heightened scrutiny
under either of these elements as the elderly "have not experienced a
'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly
indicative of their abilities." 51
The other two factors-the immutability of the characteristic and
the political powerlessness of the group-though not essential to
applying heightened scrutiny, may enhance the need for its
application.52 The immutability element was first used as an argument
43. See infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Amici Curiae
National Lesbian and Gay Law Ass'n et al., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (No. 02-102),
available at 2003 WL 152348.
44. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) ("[W]hat
differentiates sex from nonsuspect statuses as intelligence and physical disability ... is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society.").
45. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
46. Id. at 441. The Cleburne Court ultimately did not apply heightened scrutiny
for a classification based on mental retardation, finding it "undeniable ...that those
who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the
everyday world," and thus the legislature in other circumstances may have a rational
basis to make such classifications. Id. at 442.
47. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982).
48. See Frontiero,411 U.S. at 684.
49. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.14; Mass. Bd. of Ret. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,313 (1976).
50. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (citing Frontiero,411 U.S.
at 684).
51. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
52. See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
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for gender equality. Its proponents argued that an individual's lack of
control over the characteristic made "using it to justify inferior
treatment all the more invidious and unfair."53 The Supreme Court
accepted this argument because "sex, like race and national origin, is
an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of
birth," adding that imposing "special disabilities upon [individuals]
because of their sex would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility."' 5 4 Immutability of a characteristic alone, however, is
not sufficient55 and the lack of immutability, that is a behavioral
aspect, is not dispositive if other factors for heightened scrutiny exist.56
As one judge noted:
It is clear that by "immutability" the Court has never meant strict
immutability in the sense that members of the class must be
physically unable to change or mask the trait defining their class.
People can have operations to change their sex. Aliens can
ordinarily become naturalized citizens. The status of illegitimate
children can be changed. ... "[I]mmutability" may describe those
traits that are so central to a person's identity that it would be
abhorrent for57 government to penalize a person for refusing to
change them.
It is, therefore, not the "immutability" of race or sex "that is the key
to their suspectness, but the important role that these traits play in
self-perception, group affiliation, and identification by others. 58
Likewise, a group's lack of political power is also not dispositive.59
The factor was first considered in the context of aliens with pending
eligibility for citizenship because they lacked inroads to the political
process.6' The factor has subsequently been discounted because most
53. Nan D. Hunter, The Sex DiscriminationArgument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L.
& Pol'y 397, 403 (2001).
54. Frontiero,411 U.S. at 686 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175 (1972) (holding it irrational to put a penalty on illegitimate children who
were not responsible for their births)).
55. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
56. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1977).
57. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring): see also Roberts. supra note 42. at 501-07.
58. Note. The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a
Suspect Classification. 98 Harv. L. Rev 1285. 1303 (1985). Though not directlv
addressing the issue of the suspect status of gavs and lesbians, the Supreme Court in
Lawrence v. Texas, see infra Part I.B.3, acknowledged that, "[alt the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992)).
59. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
60. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978).
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groups now accorded heightened scrutiny are not "politically
powerless" in the sense that "they have no ability to attract the
attention of the lawmakers."61 Today, neither blacks nor women can
claim to be politically powerless, yet both6 2race and gender remain
suspect classes meriting heightened scrutiny.
B. Sexual Orientation Under Equal Protection

Prior to the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Romer,63 the leading
case regarding sexual orientation was the then ten-year-old Bowers v.
Hardwick, which held that a statute criminalizing private, consensual
sodomy did not violate the Due Process Clause.' Subsequently,
courts attempted to apply the Bowers holding65 to claims of equal
protection violations based on sexual orientation.
1. Bowers v. Hardwick6 6 and Its Progeny
In Bowers, a gay man, respondent Hardwick, challenged the
constitutionality of a Georgia statute that criminalized sodomy
(regardless of the gender of the participants) after he was charged
67
The
with its violation, though he was not ultimately prosecuted.
Bowers Court, reversing the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, found that there was no fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy as such a right was not "'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would
exist if [it was] sacrificed."' 6
Based on this due process holding, subsequent cases found that
homosexuals were not a suspect class for equal protection analysis and
that classifications based on sexual orientation were permissible
because they were based on conduct rather than orientation or
status.69 For example, in Padula v. Webster,7" the D.C. Circuit noted,
"[i]t would be quite anomalous.., to declare status defined by
61. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985); see,
e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to law
school's consideration of race in its application process); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 555 (1996) ("[AJIl gender-based classifications today warrant heightened
scrutiny." (citation omitted)).
62. See supra note 61.
63. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
64. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
65. See infra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.
66. 478 U.S. at 186.
67. Id. at 187-88.
68. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
69. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 950-51 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc);
High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir.
1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97,
103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
70. 822 F.2d at 97.
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conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of
strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 71 In distinguishing

homosexuality from other traits, another court stated, "[m]embers of
recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes, e.g., blacks or women,

exhibit immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality is primarily
behavioral in nature.... The conduct or behavior of the members of a
recognized suspect or quasi-suspect class has no relevance to the
All federal cases holding
identification of those groups. '72

otherwise-that gay men and lesbians do constitute a suspect class-

have been reversed or had their opinions withdrawn.73
Judge Norris of the Ninth Circuit authored a noteworthy
concurrence in Watkins v. United States Army 74 that stands inapposite
to the line of decisions refusing to treat homosexuals as a suspect class
after Bowers.75 Declining to apply Bowers to a claimed equal
protection violation, Judge Norris would have affirmed the district

court's finding that homosexuals in fact constitute a suspect class

requiring the application of heightened scrutiny.76 Judge Norris made

the distinction between conduct and sexual orientation and limited
Bowers to its due process holding, noting that "nothing in [Bowers]
suggests that the state may penalize gays merely for their sexual
orientation.... [T]he class of persons involved in [Bowers]-those
who engage in homosexual sodomy-is not congruous with the class
of persons targeted by [the classification] -those with a homosexual
orientation. '77 He continued, "homosexuals do not become 'fair
game' for discrimination simply because their sexual practices are not
Moreover, he
considered part of our mainstream traditions. 78
criticized the reasoning in Padula for relying on the "false premise
that [Bowers] issues a blanket approval for discrimination against
71. Id. at 103; see also Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 ("If homosexual conduct may
constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or
quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection
purposes.")
72. Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 (internal citations omitted); see also High Tech
Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 ("Homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is
behavioral and hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or
alienage. .. ").
73. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that sexual orientation is a suspect classification and thus deserves
heightened scrutiny), vacated and aff'd en banc on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1989); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 864-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (same),
rev'd, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1551 (D. Kan.
1991) (same), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec.
Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (same), rev'd, 895 F.2d at
563.
74. 875 F.2d at 711-31 (Norris, J., concurring).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 728.
77. Id. at 716 (internal citation omitted).
78. Id. at 719.
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homosexuals.... [Bowers] held only that the constitutionally
sodomy.
protected right to privacy does not extend to homosexual
79
protection.
equal
with
do
to
nothing
had
case
The
Judge Norris explored each of the factors for heightened scrutiny
outlined above.80 He noted that sexual orientation has "no relevance
to a person's 'ability to perform or contribute to society"' and that
such irrelevance suggests that sexual orientation classifications
"reflect prejudice and inaccurate stereotypes."'" He also recognized
that "discrimination faced by homosexuals is plainly no less pernicious
or intense than the discrimination faced by other groups already
treated as suspect classes."82 Judge Norris continued by noting the
flexibility of the immutability factor83 and pondered "whether
heterosexuals feel capable of changing their sexual orientation" and
stated that requiring homosexuals to change a central aspect of their
identity violates "the constitutional ideal of equal protection of the
laws."'
Considering political powerlessness, Judge Norris wrote, "[t]he very
fact that homosexuals have historically been underrepresented in and
victimized by political bodies is itself strong evidence that they lack
the political power necessary to ensure fair treatment at the hands of
He observed that "at the national level...
government." 85
homosexuals have been wholly unsuccessful in getting legislation
passed that protects them from discrimination." 6 In conclusion,
Judge Norris referenced the Supreme Court's decision in Palmore v.
Sidoti, in which the Court "rejected the notion that private prejudice
against minorities can ever justify official discrimination, even when
those private prejudices create real and legitimate problems." 87
2. Romer v. Evans"
In Romer v. Evans, a decade after its decision in Bowers, the
Supreme Court, for the first time, addressed sexual orientation
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than the
Due Process Clause.8 9 In Romer, the Court invalidated Amendment 2
to the Colorado Constitution, which prohibited all legislative,
executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect homosexuals and forbade the reinstatement of
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 723.
See supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
Watkins, 875 F.2d at 725 (Norris, J., concurring).
Id. at 724. In fact, the defendant-Army conceded this point. Id.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring).
Id. at 727.
Id. at 727 n.30.
Id. at 729 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
See id.
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such laws and policies.9" Notably, Romer did not address the issue of
whether homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, as

that issue was rejected by the trial court and not appealed.9'
Consequently, on its face, the Court applied only rational basis review
in striking down the
Colorado voters
after a contentious
various Colorado

amendment.9 2
passed Amendment 2 by statewide referendum
campaign in response to ordinances passed by
municipalities including Aspen, Boulder, and

Denver that banned discrimination by reason of sexual orientation in
both public and private spheres of housing, employment, education,
public accommodations, and health and welfare services.93 The effect

of the amendment was to "withdraw[] from homosexuals, but no
others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by
discrimination, and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and

policies" 94 and it may be inferred that the amendment might also
deprive gay men and lesbians even of laws and policies of general

applicability that prohibit arbitrary discrimination. 95 The Court noted
that the protections denied gay men and lesbians by Amendment 2

are those "taken for granted by most people either because they
'
already have them or do not need them." 96
The Court held that Amendment 2 violated equal protection
because it imposed a "broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
named group" and its great breadth was so far removed from any of

the asserted governmental interests that the amendment "seems

inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects."9' 7 The
Court wrote, "[i]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of
90. Id. at 627.
91. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 n.3 (Colo. 1994).
92. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 ("By requiring that the classification bear a
rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by
the law.").
93. Id. at 623-24. Amendment 2 stated the following:
"No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual
Orientation. Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or
school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation,
ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing."
Id. at 624 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 627.
95. Id. at 630.
96. Id. at 631.
97. Id. at 632. The government had asserted "respect for other citizens' freedom
of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have
personal or religious objections to homosexuality" as well as an interest in
"conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups" Id. at 635.
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the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest."98 The Court found Amendment 2

to be a "status-based enactment divorced from any factual context
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state

interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake,

something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit."99
Justice Scalia wrote a vigorous dissent in Romer in which he
asserted that Colorado had proffered the valid and legitimate interests
of maintaining the associational rights of its citizens and preserving
"traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful
minority" and thus, under rational basis review, Amendment 2 was
constitutional.10 Justice Scalia noted that the only "animus" present
was "moral disapproval of homosexual conduct," which he found a

permissible state interest under rational basis review.ul He further
relied on the reasoning of the Bowers-Padula line of cases, writing,
"[ilf it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual
conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to
enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct." 1"

A significant line of scholarly commentary supports the notion that,
based on its decision in Romer, the Supreme Court may be on the
verge of finding homosexuals to be a suspect class, should the
question eventually present itself.0 3 One such line of thinking draws a

parallel between the Court's treatment of gender classifications

through its initial use of rational basis review in Reed v. Reed '° 4 to its
adoption of intermediate scrutiny for gender in Frontiero v.
Richardson."°5 As in Romer, the Reed Court did not address the
98. Id. at 634-35 (citing U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
99. Id. at 635; see also Lewis, supra note 36, at 190-91 ("Romer stands for the
broader proposition that anti-gay bias cannot be a legitimate motivation for
legislation. That is, legislation cannot be motivated by pure 'animosity.').
100. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. ld. at 644.
102. Id. at 641.
103. See, e.g., Edward Stein, Introducing Lawrence v. Texas: Some Background
and a Glimpse of the Future, 10 Cardozo Women's L.J. 263, 270 (2004) ("[S]ome
scholars have proposed that Romer suggests that somewhat heightened scrutiny for
sexual orientation is just around the corner."); Lewis, supra note 36, at 190 ("Some
scholars have contended that although the Romer decision itself does not identify
sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect class, it is the first step on the road towards that
end."); see also infra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
104. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
105. 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stein, supra note 103, at 269-70 (citing Pettinga, supra
note 10, at 803 (encouraging the Court to use intermediate scrutiny in "rational basis
with bite" situations)). In Frontiero, the Court invalidated a statutory provision
requiring a woman in the uniformed services to demonstrate that her spouse was in
fact dependent on her for over one half of his support in order to obtain benefits for
that spouse though male service members received spousal benefits regardless of their
spouse's dependence. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678-79. In so holding, the Court found
classifications based on sex to be inherently suspect with implicit support for that
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suspect class issue, but rather "provided no fact-based analysis that
could have lent support to a future determination that a gender
classification was, in fact, rationally related to a legitimate end.""1 6
Further, Romer, like Reed, summarily dismissed the government's
asserted interests, here in protecting associational liberty,
discouraging political factionalism, and prioritizing discrimination
claims, and saw through those interests to find an underlying
impermissible motivating factor for the classification." 7
The Romer opinion is also notable for its acknowledgement of
sexual orientation as a self-identifying trait and not just a means of
categorizing a group associated with particular behavior or sexual
conduct.0 8 In his analysis of Romer, Professor Cass Sunstein wrote
that "it is no longer legitimate to discriminate against homosexuals as
a class simply because the state wants to discourage homosexuality or
homosexual behavior. The state must justify discrimination on some
Polygamy, adultery, and
other, public-regarding ground."10 9
fornication are punished for the harm stemming from such conduct
while homosexuals are
subject to a deeper kind of social antagonism, connected not only
with their acts but also with their identity. It is this status feature
that links discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation with
discrimination on the basis of race or sex.... [Amendment 2
demonstrates] a desire to isolate and seal off members of a despised
group whose characteristics are thought to be in some sense
contaminating or corrosive. 10
Sunstein connected the Romer outcome to that in United States v.
Virginia, where the court found a military academy's exclusion of
women unconstitutional,"' in that both decisions embody "a ban on
laws motivated by a desire to create second-class citizenship" or

conclusion in Reed v. Reed. Id. at 682. The Frontiero Court described Reed as a
justified departure from traditional rational basis analysis in that even in the face of a
state interest "'not without some legitimacy,"' the classification was still the kind of
"'arbitrary legislative choice' forbidden by the Constitution. Id. at 684 (quoting

Reed, 404 U.S. at 76).
106. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Case Note, PrincipledSilence, 106 Yale L.J. 247, 250
(1996).
107. See id. at 250-52.
108. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L.

Rev. 6, 68 (1996). In an earlier article written shortly after the Ninth Circuit's initial
decision in Watkins, see supra notes 74-87, and before that decision was later
withdrawn, Professor Sunstein noted that the Watkins decision "provides reason to

believe that constitutional protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation will ultimately take place under the Equal Protection Clause," which, in
contrast to the Due Process Clause, "is grounded in a norm of equality that operates

largely as a critique of traditional practices." Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1179.
109. Sunstein, supra note 108, at 62.

110. Id.
111. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 539-40 (1996).
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"be

unconstitutional to make 'homosexual status' a crime.''113
Other commentators have linked the Romer decision to what has
been termed the "pariah principle," arguing that "gays and lesbians
are a group that cannot be relegated to outcast status."" 4 These
commentators contend that "[wlhether the badge of inferiority is a
black skin, or a yellow star, or a pink triangle, the pariah principle
forbids the government from relegating any class of citizens to the
status of untouchables.""' 5 This theory relies heavily on, though does
not require, evidence that homosexuality is an immutable trait.116 The
idea stems in part from Senator Jacob Howard who, in defending the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment, stated that its purpose was to
"'abolish all class legislation.., and [do] away with the injustice of
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to
another."'117
3. Lawrence v. Texas 18
Seven years after Romer, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court
addressed the same circumstances it had in Bowers.119 Once again, it
avoided the question of whether to apply heightened scrutiny to
sexual orientation classifications, instead basing its holding on the
Due Process Clause.120 In Lawrence, the Court overruled its decision
in Bowers and invalidated a Texas statute criminalizing same-sex
sodomy based on a right to privacy that, under due process, extends to
consensual intimate conduct between adults. 21 Though the Court
112. Sunstein, supra note 108, at 63.
113. Id. at 66 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (holding
unconstitutional a California law that made the status of narcotics addiction a crime)).
114. Lewis, supra note 36, at 192-94.
115. Id. at 194 (quoting Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The PariahPrinciple, 13
Const. Comment. 257, 275 (1996)); see also Eskridge & Hunter, supra note 2, at 280
("[Tihe Court ought not tolerate a law that marks a class as presumptive criminals
and has so many discriminatory ramifications that it effectively creates an underclass
of people outside the protections of the rule of law.").
116. Lewis, supra note 36, at 194. For a discussion of scientific evidence of the
immutable nature of homosexuality and its use in equal protection litigation, see
Symposium, Queer Law 1999: Current Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgendered Law, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 279, 348-64 (1999); and Stephen
Zamansky, Colorado'sAmendment 2 and Homosexuals' Right to Equal Protection of
the Law, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 221, 241-44 (1993).
117. Lewis, supra note 36, at 195 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766
(1866)).
118. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
119. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
120. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. One notable difference between Bowers and
Lawrence is that the Texas statute prohibited only same-sex sodomy while the
Georgia statute prohibited the conduct across the board. Id. at 566.
121. Id. at 564, 578. The Court noted, "'[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of
all, not to mandate our own moral code."' Id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
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declined to base its holding in the Equal Protection Clause,'2 2 it said
such an argument was "tenable" and wrote, "[w]ere we to hold the
statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently,
say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex
participants.' 12 3 The Court continued, "[e]quality of treatment and
the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and
a decision on the latter point advances both interests."'' 24 The Court
noted that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the "right to define
one's own concept of existence," adding that personal choices so
central to dignity and autonomy "could not define the attributes 125
of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
Without addressing any potential government interests to support the
statute, the Court again used what it characterized as rational basis
review to find that the statute "furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual."' 26
Justice O'Connor, unlike her brethren in the majority, explicitly
found that the Texas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause,
rather than the Due Process Clause and, further, did so under an
unambiguous use of rational basis with bite.127 Justice O'Connor
justified her use of "a more searching form of rational basis review"
based on the statute's "desire to harm a politically unpopular
group." '8 Echoing the sentiments of Romer, she wrote, "[m]oral
disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause."' 2 9 Citing Justice Harlan's famous dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson, in which he stated that the law "neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens,"' 3 ° O'Connor found that the law
targeted not just conduct, but "gay persons as a class" with
ramifications in an array of areas outside the criminal law.'
122. For an analysis of the Lawrence Court's evasion of the equal protection claim,
see Adrienne Butcher, Note, Selective ConstitutionalAnalysis in Lawrence v. Texas:
An Exercise in Judicial Restraint or a Willingness to Reconsider Equal Protection
Classificationfor Homosexuals?, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1407 (2004).
123. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574-75.
124. Id. at 575.
125. Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
126. Id. at 578.
127. See id. at 584 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 580.
129. Id. at 582 (citation omitted).
130. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
131. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
noted that, in Texas, calling someone a homosexual constituted slander per se and
further that the law created a presumption of criminality for homosexuals resulting in
legally sanctioned discrimination. Id.
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Justice Scalia dissented, again finding majoritarian sexual morality
to be a sufficient and legitimate government interest. He declared2
that the majority's opinion sounded the end of all moral legislation.1
Refusing to make the distinction between conduct and sexual
orientation, Scalia observed no equal protection problem, finding that
the statute did not discriminate against men or women as a class, and
applied equally to heterosexuals and homosexuals. 33 Further, he
found the majority's failure to recognize the promotion of
majoritarian sexual morality as a legitimate interest to be so "out of
accord" with Supreme Court jurisprudence that it "require[d] little
discussion." ' 34 Because Justice Scalia felt the statute implicated no
suspect classification, or any classification for that matter, traditional
rational basis review was applicable and satisfied by the Texas
legislature's legitimate interest in curbing immoral and unacceptable
forms of sexual behavior.135
II. THE PROBLEMS AND INCONSISTENCIES OF POST-ROMER CASE
LAW

The Romer and Lawrence decisions provide the backdrop for a host
of decisions addressing sexual orientation classifications in the federal
and state court systems since 1996. Ignoring the implications of these
decisions, federal courts have continued to apply traditional rational
basis review without examining whether the classification at issue may
be based on animus or notions of majoritarian morality without a true
legitimate governmental interest.136 State courts, by contrast, have
been more willing to apply rational basis with bite, often under the
auspices of their respective state constitutions.137 Less than a handful
of jurisdictions have ventured that extra step to treat gay men and
lesbians as a true suspect class and thus acknowledge their use of
heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications. 38 The
legacy of Romer and Lawrence will lie in which of these
interpretations ultimately prevails.
A. Maintaining TraditionalRationalBasis Review
Since Romer, the lower federal courts have heard numerous cases
involving claims of sexual orientation discrimination, most often in the
contexts of public employment or the dismissal of armed services

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 599-600.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 599-600.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
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personnel.139 Regardless of their outcome, the decisions in these cases
have relied heavily on rational basis review and the traditional
deference courts are expected to give to any seemingly legitimate
interest proffered by the relevant authority. 4 ' These cases can be
divided into two groups, the separation of which appears to be
determinative of their outcome: (1) "interest free" cases in which the
relevant authority does not offer a legitimate interest for the
discrimination, the relevant authority claims no discrimination took
place, or the classification is found to have been based solely on
animus leading to a finding of an equal protection violation;4 ' and (2)
"interest asserted" cases in which the relevant authority asserts a
governmental interest for the discrimination leading to a finding of no
violation. 4 2 Lacking clear guidance as to the applicability of rational
basis with bite, both the interest free and interest asserted cases rely
exclusively on traditional rational basis review.'43
1. "Interest Free" Cases
The first of the "interest free" cases, Nabozny v. Podlesny, involved
a student that was repeatedly assaulted based on his sexual
orientation while the defendant school district failed to respond
appropriately or, in some instances, at all.'" Though the Romer
opinion had already been issued at the time of this decision, the
Seventh Circuit chose not to directly rely on it in order to avoid
qualified immunity analysis complications that might have precluded
its application to the defendants because their discriminatory actions
occurred before the Romer opinion had been issued.'45 Still, relying
on the well-established rule of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, that if a law is
applied by a public authority unequally between persons similarly
situated, "the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the Constitution,"' 46 the Court held that it was "unable to garner any
rational basis for permitting one student to assault another based on
139. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Philips v. Perry,
106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997); Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996); Quinn
v. Nassau County Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Glover v.
Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
140. See infra Parts II.A.1-II.A.2.
141. See infra Part II.A.1.
142. See infra Part II.A.2. For purvoses of this discussion, this distinction assumes
that the vlaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that he or she has suffered intentional
and purposeful discrimination because of his or her sexual orientation. See, e.g.,
Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 453-54.
143. See infra Parts II.A.1-2.
144. See Nebozny, 92 F.3d at 446.
145. Id. at 458 n.12. By not relying on Romer, the court obviated a possible appeal
on the grounds that the defendants were not sufficiently on notice that their conduct
might have violated equal protection under the Supreme Court's opinion in Romer
which was issued after oral argument in Nabozny. See id.
146. Id. at 458 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886)).
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sexual orientation and the defendants do not offer us
the victim's
14 7
one."

In Stemler v. City of Florence, the Sixth Circuit also cited the
principle in Yick Wo in finding that selective prosecution by a police
officer based on perceived sexual orientation violated equal
protection. 48 In this case, defendant police officers arrested Stemler
for driving under the influence "out of a desire to effectuate an
animus against homosexuals" because they perceived her to be a
lesbian, though, in fact, she was not. 49 Further, these officers failed to
arrest a similarly situated heterosexual male at the scene who had also
been driving under the influence. 5 ° Echoing Romer, the court found
that since a "desire to effectuate one's animus against homosexuals
can never be a legitimate governmental purpose, a state action based
on that animus alone violates the Equal Protection Clause."151
Notably, the court held that Romer, though applicable, was not
necessary to its holding as the Supreme Court had already held that a
bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group was an
impermissible motive in United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno.52
In 1998, two district court cases also found equal protection
violations in the context of rehiring gay teachers.'5 3 In an Ohio case,
the district court found that a school district board had discriminated
against a gay teacher based on his sexual orientation when it failed to
renew his teaching contract, yet retained the services of a less
54
qualified heterosexual teacher who was similarly up for renewal.
The court noted that "the defendants did not present any evidence at
trial to support a legitimate rationale for discriminating against
homosexual teachers."' 55 A Utah case involved a similar violation
when a school district failed to renew a public school teacher's
coaching position based on her sexual orientation.'56 The court wrote,
"[ilf the community's perception is based on nothing more than
unsupported assumptions, outdated stereotypes, and animosity, it is
necessarily irrational and under Romer,... it provides no legitimate
support."' 57 The court observed that the record contained no jobrelated reasons for not reassigning the plaintiff to her coaching
147. Id.
148. See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1997).
149. Id. at 873.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 874.
152. Id. (discussing U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)).
153. See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
154. Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160,
1172 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
155. Id. at 1174.
156. See Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998).
157. Id. at 1289.
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position or how her sexual orientation bore any relevance to her
competency as a coach.158 Recalling the Supreme Court's decision in
Palmore v. Sidoti, the court continued, "the private antipathy of some
members of a community cannot validate state discrimination."15' 9
Two district courts in the Second Circuit similarly disposed of two
other "interest free" cases. 6
In Quinn v. Nassau County Police
6
Department,1
1 a police officer brought an equal protection claim
based on the systematic abuse and harassment he suffered at the
hands of his fellow officers, conduct which his supervisors condoned
or ignored. 16 The court found that a "hostile work environment
directed against homosexuals based on their sexual orientation
constitute[s] an Equal Protection violation,' 1 63 and that "[sluch
harassment.., cannot survive a rational basis review when it is
motivated by irrational fear and prejudice towards homosexuals."'"
In Zavatsky v. Anderson, 65 the plaintiff brought an equal protection
claim after the Connecticut Department of Child and Family Services
deprived her of her right to visit her partner's son, and participate in
planning related to his care, thereby ignoring their well-documented66
familial relationship in contravention of the agency's own policies.
The court, noting that sexual orientation classifications are only
entitled to rational basis review, 67 found that the plaintiff sufficiently
stated a claim for an equal protection violation since the defendants
had no rational basis for their
classification of the plaintiff on the basis
68
orientation.
sexual
of her
In 2004, the Fifth Circuit considered an "interest free" case, in
which a prison inmate alleged that prison officials failed to adequately
protect him from sexual assaults based on anti-gay animus'69 while the
defendants alleged their actions were motivated by a "status-neutral
determination."' 70 The court, citing Romer, held that "a state violates
the Equal Protection Clause if it disadvantages homosexuals for
reasons lacking any rational relationship to legitimate governmental
aims."'' In holding for the inmate, the court was ultimately swayed
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
161. 53 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
162. Id. at 357-58.
163. Id. at 357.
164. Id. at 358.
165. 130 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Conn. 2001).
166. Id. at 351-52.
167. Id. at 356.
168. Id. at 358.
169. Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 514 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Adam Liptak,
Ex-Inmate's Suit Offers View into Sexual Slavery in Prisons, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16,
2004, at Al.
170. Johnson, 385 F.3d at 532.
171. Id.
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by the state's lack of any legitimate aim or interest for its disparate
172
treatment of the plaintiff.
2. "Interest Asserted" Cases
In contrast to the "interest free" cases discussed above, each of the
"interest asserted" cases described below involves courts' findings that
the classification in question satisfies traditional rational basis review
because the government has proffered an interest rationally related to
a legitimate governmental objective. 73 Two courts, for example,
found a rational basis to discriminate against homosexuals in cases
challenging the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. 174 In Philips v.
Perry, the Ninth Circuit, using rational basis review, concluded that
''maintaining effective armed forces is indisputably a compelling
governmental purpose and that the policy of excluding from the
military those members who engage in homosexual conduct is
rationally related to this purpose... 'in light of the special

172. Id. at 532-33 ("The defendants have not attempted to argue that according
homosexuals less protection than other inmates would advance any legitimate aim.").
173. See infra notes 174-211 and accompanying text.
174. See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Philips v. Perry, 106
F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997). The "don't ask, don't tell" policy provides for a service
member's separation from the armed services if he or she has: (1) "engaged in,
attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act"; (2)
"stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual, ... unless... the member has
demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in,
has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts"; or (3) has
"married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex." 10
U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)-(3) (2000). The statute defines "homosexual act" as "(A) any
bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the
same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires; and (B) any bodily contact which
a reasonable person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to
engage in an act described in subparagraph (A)." Id. § 654(f)(3). The Department of
Defense Directive which implements the statute provides that
[a] statement by a member that demonstrates a propensity or intent to
engage in homosexual acts is grounds for separation not because it reflects
the member's sexual orientation, but because the statement indicates a
likelihood that the member engages in or will engage in homosexual acts. A
member's sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter,
and is not a bar to continued service under this section unless manifested by
homosexual conduct ....
Dep't of Def., Department of Defense Directive 1332.14(E3.A1.1.8.1.1.), Dec. 21,
at,
available
1993,
In
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d133214wch1_122193/d133214p.pdf.
its legislative findings, Congress found that "[t]he armed forces must maintain
personnel policies that exclude persons whose presence in the armed forces would
create an unacceptable risk to the armed forces' high standards of morale, good order
and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability" and that
the presence of "persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts" would create such an unacceptable risk. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14)(15).
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The court, finding

the policy was based on conduct rather than status, accepted the
Navy's explanation that separating members who engage in
homosexual conduct was necessary to maintain military effectiveness,
accommodating personal privacy and
"by maintaining unit cohesion,
76
tension."'
sexual
reducing
In Able v. United States, other armed service members challenged
the "don't ask, don't tell" policy.'7 7 In upholding the policy and
explaining its departure from Romer's line of analysis, the Second
Circuit explicitly noted that Romer, Cleburne, and Palmore used
analyses that "differed from traditional rational basis review because
[they] forced the government to justify its discrimination," stating that
"the Court did not simply defer to the government; it scrutinized the
justifications offered by the government to determine whether they
were rational. '17s The Able court conceded that government action
motivated by "irrational fear and prejudice toward homosexuals"
could not survive rational basis review in a civil setting, but ultimately
held that the government had a legitimate interest in discriminating
against homosexuals due to the uniqueness of the military setting and
Consequently,
the deference accorded to military decisions.9
because of the deference accorded the armed forces in its selfregulation, the "don't ask, don't tell" policy was rationally related to
legitimate governmental interests.8 0
In contrast to its decision in Nabozny, finding an equal protection
violation where a school district failed to curb the sexual orientation
discrimination of a student,18' in Schroeder v. Hamilton School
District,"2 the Seventh Circuit found that harassment of a teacher by
students, parents, and staff due to his sexual orientation did not
constitute such a violation.8 3 The harassment in Schroeder included
accusations that the plaintiff had AIDS, frequent obscenities and
catcalls, and harassing phone calls, many of which were anonymous."
175. Philips, 106 F.3d at 1425-26 (quoting Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810
(9th Cir. 1980)).
176. Id. at 1429. Notably, the majority opinion did not mention Romer anywhere
in its analysis. See id. at 1421-32 (failing to discuss Romer in upholding the "don't ask,
don't tell" policy).
177. Able, 155 F.3d at 628; see supra note 174.
178. Able, 155 F.3d at 634. It should be noted that in deciding Palmore, the Court
in fact applied strict scrutiny due to the presence of a classification based on race. See
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
179. Able, 155 F.3d at 634-35; cf. Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 732-34 (4th Cir.
2002) (finding legitimate penological interest under rational basis review in
segregation of homosexual male inmates for reasons of prohibiting sexual activity and
avoiding potential friction and violence among the prison population).
180. Able, 155 F.3d at 634.
181. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
182. 282 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2002).
183. See id. at 950-51.
184. Id. at 948-49.
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In response, the school district offered a general instruction to
teachers to discipline those students who used inappropriate language
or behavior.185 The court cited the limited resources of public schools,
the school's prerogative to prioritize use of those resources to obviate
other types of prejudice, and finally that "the well-being of students,
not teachers, must be the primary concern of school administrators"
as justifications for the school's failure to address the plaintiff's
complaints.'86 The court deferred to the school district, writing, "[in
the absence of deliberate indifference, federal judges should not use
rational basis review as a mechanism to impose their own social values
on public school administrators who already have innumerable
'
challenges to face." 187
a. Rational Basis Review After Remand
Two cases in particular exemplify how reluctant lower courts may
be to apply rational basis with bite in the context of sexual orientation
and equal protection: Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati,Inc.
8 8 which was remanded for reconsideration to the
v. City of Cincinnati,'
Sixth Circuit by the Supreme Court in light of its just-rendered Romer
decision;189 and State v. Limon, 9 ' which was similarly remanded by the
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals of Kansas in light of the
Supreme Court's just-rendered decision in Lawrence. 9 '
In Equality Foundation, the Sixth Circuit, using rational basis
review, upheld the constitutionality of Article XII, an amendment to
the Cincinnati city charter passed by referendum 9 2 that prospectively
prohibited and eliminated any existing anti-discrimination protections
for lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.'93 The court determined that
185. Id. at 949.
186. Id. at 952. Though not used to directly support the classification, the court
also remarked, "there is no simple way of explaining to young students why it is
wrong to mock homosexuals without discussing the underlying lifestyle or sexual
behavior associated with such a designation." Id. at 954.
187. Id. at 956. Concurring, Judge Posner agreed with the majority but wrote
separately to emphasize that "[h]omosexuals have not been accorded the
constitutional status of blacks or women" and consequently face a higher burden of
demonstrating that the alleged withdrawal of state protection was completely
"irrational" or "motivated by baseless hostility." Id. at 957 (Posner, J., concurring).
188. 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
189. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001
(1996).
190. 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), review granted, No. 00-85898-AS, 2004 Kan.
LEXIS 284 (Kan. May 25, 2004). One scholar has described this case as "more likely
to push the equal protection argument applied to sexual orientation." See Stein, supra
note 103, at 285.
191. Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003).
192. Equal. Found., 128 F.3d at 301.
193. Id.at 291. Article XII stated the following:
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON
COND UCT OR RELATIONSHIPS.
ORIENTATION,
SEXUAL
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Bowers and its progeny prohibited the treatment of homosexuals as a
suspect or quasi-suspect class. 94 The court observed that Article XII

"satisfied minimal constitutional requirements" because it advanced

valid community interests, "including enhanced associational liberty

for its citizenry, conservation of public resources, and augmentation of
individual autonomy imbedded in personal conscience and
morality."' 195 The court ultimately rested its holding on the Cincinnati
electorate's interest in conserving public and private financial
resources and thus the court did not need to discuss the "equally
justifiable community interests" of associational liberty and
community moral disapproval of homosexuality. 196
Even so,
according to the court, Romer did not reject associational liberty and

moral disapproval of homosexuality as legitimate interests, but rather
concluded, "under the facts and circumstances of Romer, the state's
'
argument in support of Colorado Amendment 2 was not credible."197
The court distinguished Article XII from Colorado's Amendment 2
at issue in Romer by noting that Article XI applied only to the lowest
level of government and that its language did not deprive
homosexuals of all legal protections under municipal law, but only
eliminated "special class status" and "preferential treatment."'98 Laws
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not
enact, adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy
which provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status,
conduct, or relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person
with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected status, quota
preference or other preferential treatment. This provision of the City
Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation,
rule or policy enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the
foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or effect.
Id.
194. Id. at 292-93. The court added, "[tihe party challenging the rationality of
legislation bears the burden of negating every conceivable basis for that enactment,
regardless of whether or not such supporting rationale was cited by, or actually relied
upon by, the promulgating authority." Id. at 293 n.4 (citing FCC v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313-15 (1993)).
195. Id. at 293-94. For an argument supporting the Sixth Circuit's use of
majoritarian morality as a legitimate interest, see Robert F. Bodi, Note, Democracy at
Work: The Sixth Circuit Upholds the Right of the People of Cincinnati to Choose
Their Own Morality in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of
Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), 32 Akron L. Rev. 667, 670 (1999) ("[Cjourts
should abandon their elitist usurpation of democracy and allow the popular will to
determine the role of morality in the governance of a city, the political unit closest to
the people themselves."). On November 2, 2004, Cincinnati voters repealed this
amendment by a 54-46 percent margin. Kate Zernike, Groups Vow Not to Let Losses
Dash Gay Rights, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2004, at A30; Christopher Curtis, Cincinnati
Voters
Repeal
Anti-Gay
Law
(Nov.
3,
2004),
at
http://www.planetout.com/news/article.html?2004/11/03/5.
196. Equal.Found., 128 F.3d at 301.
197. Id. at 300-01.
198. Id. at 296-97.
The Romer Court rejected a similar interpretation of
Amendment 2. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996). For further comparison
of Romer and Equality, see infra text accompanying notes 308-17.
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of general applicability would still apply to gay men and lesbians as
they do all citizens. 9 9 In the absence of an infringement on a
fundamental right or the presence of a suspect or quasi-suspect class,
the court found the statute presumptively valid and "entitled to the
highest degree of deference from the courts."'2 '
In Limon, the plaintiff alleged that limiting the applicability of a
Kansas statute to opposite sex partners ran afoul of the Equal
Protection Clause because it punished consensual heterosexual
sodomy with a minor less severely than consensual homosexual
sodomy with a minor.2"' Plaintiff Limon, a minor himself, was
sentenced to 206 months imprisonment (over seventeen years)
followed by sixty months of supervised release,20 2 while a heterosexual
with Limon's previous adjudications would have received thirteen to
fifteen months with presumptive probation for the same conduct
under the "Romeo and Juliet" exception governing consensual sexual
activity between minors of the opposite sex. 2 3 Outlining its rational
basis review, the court noted that a law is presumed constitutional
even if it results in some inequality2z and further that equal protection
analysis "is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or
logic of legislative choices., 20 5 Applying this review, the court found
that "the legislature could have reasonably determined that... [the
statute] would encourage and preserve the traditional sexual mores of
society., 216 The court cited protecting and advancing the family as a
legitimate purpose behind the distinction because same-sex sexual
acts do not lead to procreation. 2 7 Though the case was remanded for
reconsideration in light of Lawrence, the court distinguished Lawrence
on the grounds that Lawrence rested on the Due Process Clause and
was thus inapplicable to Limon's equal protection claim.20 8
The concurring judge in Limon did not ascribe to the same
legitimate interests as the majority opinion, but still found that an
"intention to protect children from increased health risks associated
with homosexual activity until they are old enough to be more certain
of their choice," though concededly "tenuous," was a sufficient

199. Equal Found., 128 F.3d at 297.
200. Id.
201. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 232 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), review granted, No. 0085898-AS, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 284 (Kan. May 25, 2004).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 243 (Pierron, J., dissenting). Even criminal (adult) sodomy had a
sentencing range of only 55 to 61 months with presumptive imprisonment. Id.; see also
Eskridge & Hunter, supra note 2, at 282-83.
204. Limon, 83 P.3d at 233 (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26
(1961)).
205. Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313 (1993)).
206. Id. at 236.
207. Id. at 237.
208. Id. at 235.
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justification for the classification. 20 9 The concurrence found that the
distinction between equal protection and due process "controls the
outcome of this case," leaving the court to determine the equal
protection question of "whether a rational basis exists to treat
homosexual activity with a child differently from heterosexual activity
with a child," rather than the due process question of the appropriate
210
level of punishment for sexual conduct between minors generally.
The concurrence, as stated above, agreed there was such a rational
basis, even if only a tenuous one.211
B. Following Romer's Lead: Applying RationalBasis with Bite
The Supreme Court has never directly ruled on whether
homosexuals constitute a suspect class deserving of some form of
heightened scrutiny for equal protection analysis: the issue of the
possible suspect class status of gay men and lesbians was explicitly not
before the court in Romer, and Lawrence relied on the Due Process
Clause. 2 Twenty years ago, Justice Brennan, dissenting from a denial
of a writ of certiorari, opined that "discrimination against
homosexuals.., raises significant constitutional questions under both
prongs of our settled equal protection analysis, 2 1 3 noting that
homosexuals were a "significant and insular minority, 21 4 were
relatively powerless in the political arena, and have historically faced
discrimination that may reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than
rationality.2 15 Consequently, "[sltate action taken against members of
such [a] group[] based simply on their status as members of the group
traditionally has been'216subjected to strict, or at least heightened,
scrutiny by this Court.
Though neither Romer nor Lawrence implemented Justice
Brennan's views, the decisions demonstrate a more searching or
meaningful form of rational basis review-or rational basis with bite
in application if not in name-by directly addressing the legitimate
interests proffered by the government and assessing whether those
interests are rationally related to the classification in question.217 As
209. Id. at 242 (Malone, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 241.
211. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
212. See supra Parts I.B.2-3; see also Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470
U.S. 1009, 1015-16 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
213. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 458 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, the Court does not label its handiwork
heightened scrutiny, and perhaps the method employed must.., be called 'second
order' rational-basis review."); Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d Cir. 1998);
Pettinga, supra note 10, passim.
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discussed above, federal courts have thus far been unwilling to
embrace this type of review, leaving it to a small number of dissenting
opinions to invoke the rational basis with bite approach. 218 Not facing
the same constitutional restrictions as federal courts, state courts have
been more willing to deviate from the traditional tiered framework by
employing rational basis with bite.2' 9
1. Biting Dissents: Rational Basis with Bite in Federal Court
Though the lower federal courts have shown their reluctance to
stray from rational basis review, some dissenting opinions in the
"interest asserted" cases have more directly invoked the "bite"
indicated in Romer by more closely scrutinizing the relationship of the
government's asserted interests with the sexual orientation
classifications at issue.22 0
For example, Judge Fletcher, dissenting in Philips v. Perry,
concluded that "the military's ['don't ask, don't tell'] policy of
differentiating between the private sexual activities of its heterosexual
and homosexual service members [was] not rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. ' 221 Judge Fletcher reasoned that "unit
cohesion," though a legitimate interest, was not furthered by the
policy in a "rational and reasonably related way 2 22 because the
government acknowledged that gay and lesbian service members are
equally able to perform their duties and contribute to the unit, and an
interest in unit cohesion was not legitimate if based on private
biases.223 Similarly, Judge Wood, dissenting in Schroeder v. Hamilton
School District, found the school district's failure to respond to the
plaintiff-teacher's complaints of harassment lacked a rational
relationship to the government's asserted reason of prioritizing
limited resources.224 She added, "[n]othing in Romer justifies a system
under which a state or state actors.., deliberately either omit
altogether or give a diminished form of legal protection from verbal or

218. See infra Part II.B.1.
219. See infra Part II.B.2.
220. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 959 (7th Cir. 2002)
(Wood, J., dissenting); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1436 (9th Cir. 1997) (Fletcher,
J., dissenting); see also supra notes 174-76, 182-87 and accompanying text.
221. Philips, 106 F.3d at 1432 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 1435.
223. Id. at 1435-36. Judge Fletcher also wrote, "[d]isapproval of homosexuality on
the part of heterosexual service members is an impermissible reason for
discriminating against gay service members." Id. at 1436 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996)).
224. Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 961 (Wood, J., dissenting). Judge Wood derisively
appended, "[a]dding two words, 'sexual orientation,' to the memorandum that was
circulated could hardly have added a second to the secretarial time involved, nor
could it have added appreciably to the amount of toner consumed by the
photocopying machine." Id.
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physical assaults to individuals in certain disfavored classes., 225 Judge
Wood further noted that the school district "never" attempted to
dissuade students, parents, or others in the community from actions
that may be considered sexual harassment discrimination or indicated
that such conduct would not be tolerated.226
2. Rational Basis with Bite in State Courts
Some state courts, on the other hand, have declined to adopt the
federal courts' comparatively strict deference to any potentially
legitimate governmental interests when presented with sexual
orientation classifications. 2 7 These courts have followed Romer's lead
interests while
by closely scrutinizing government-asserted
228
maintaining that they are exercising rational basis review.
Specifically, the Vermont and Massachusetts state courts have applied
rational basis with bite in two seminal cases regarding the right of gay
men and lesbians to marry, in significant part due to the greater
flexibility and security of their respective state constitutions.2 29

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See infra Parts II.B.2.a-b.
228. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
229. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). Other jurisdictions have also dealt with the right of
gay men and lesbians to marry at some level, including Alaska, Arizona, California,
Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Washington, D.C. These cases have reached
different conclusions based on different grounds-often due process or other
idiosyncrasies of their respective state constitutions-but none have used heightened
scrutiny based on sexual orientation. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No.
3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743, at *4-6 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) (holding
the choice of one's life partner to be a fundamental right stemming from the
fundamental rights to marry and privacy) (superseded by amendment to state
constitution); Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 462-64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
(noting that petitioners did not argue that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect or suspect
class, and denying application of strict scrutiny because homosexuals do not have a
fundamental right to marry); Woo/Martin v. State et al. ("Marriage Cases"), No. 4365,
2005 WL 583129, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005) (using rational basis with bite
as to sexual orientation and strict scrutiny as to gender under the equal protection
provision of the California Constitution to find the statutory limitation of marriaee to
one man and one woman unconstitutional): Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d
307, 331 (D.C. 1995) (concluding that same-sex marriace was not a fundamental right
deetlv rooted in our nation's history and thus not protected by the Due Process
Clause); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that sex is a "suspect
category" for purposes of equal protection analysis under the Hawaii Constitution
and that HRS § 572-1-limiting marriage to opposite-gender partners-is subject to
strict scrutiny) (superseded by amendment to state constitution); Lewis v. Harris, No.
MER-L-15-03, 2003 WL 23191114, at *23 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2003)
(unpublished) (holding that "the State has articulated more than adequate reasons to
support the public need for [restricting marriage to one man and one woman]" under
New Jersey's State Constitution); Hernandez v. Robles, No. 103434/2004, 2005 WL
363778, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2005) (concluding that the fundamental right to
marry extends to gay men and lesbians under the New York Constitution).
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a. Baker v. State 230
In Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court framed its decision

in the Vermont Constitution's common benefits clause 23' rather than
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 232 The court
veered from the multi-tiered analysis of current federal jurisprudence
and used an approach "broadly deferential to the legislative
prerogative to define and advance governmental ends, while
vigorously ensuring that the means chosen bear a just and reasonable
relation to the governmental objective., 233 The court said that state

precedent under the Vermont Constitution required "a 'more
stringent' reasonableness inquiry than was generally associated with

rational basis review under the federal constitution. '234 To eliminate
any doubt that the court was applying rational basis with bite, the

court cited as support for its deviation from traditional rational basis
an article by Professor Cass Sunstein that pointed to federal examples,
including Romer and Cleburne, in which the Supreme Court itself
made such deviations.23 5
2
b. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health

36

Similarly, in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that the

Massachusetts Constitution is "more protective of individual liberty

230. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
231. The common benefits clause of the Vermont Constitution reads, in pertinent
part, "[tlhat government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for the
particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of persons,
who are a part only of that community." Vt. Const., ch. I, art. 7.
232. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;... nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
233. Baker, 744 A.2d at 871.
234. Id. (internal citations omitted).
235. Id. at 872 n.5 (citing Sunstein, supra note 108, at 59-61). In this article,
Professor Sunstein examined what he denoted as the "Moreno-Cleburne-Romer"
trilogy and concluded that in each of these three cases, the Supreme Court deviated
from traditional rational basis review despite the presence of "poorly fitting but
probably rational justifications," because the classifications in question were more
likely reflective of "animus" or a bare desire to harm an unpopular, disliked, or feared
group than the respective interests asserted in those cases. Sunstein, supra note 108, at
61-62. Sunstein argued that this trilogy represented "decisional minimalism" in its
failure to articulate a new tier of judicial scrutiny and use of rational basis review as a
"magical trump card" to "invalidate badly motivated laws." Id. at 61. Noting the
unique nature of the Romer analysis, another scholar noted that "Romer's reasoning
is multidimensional, not linear, in the way that it alters the logic of equal protection
analysis." Nan D. Hunter, ProportionalEquality: Readings of Romer, 89 Ky. L.J. 885,
895 (2001).
236. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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and equality than the Federal Constitution '237 and, like the Lawrence
Court, focused its attention on the due process claim rather than the
equal protection claim, since a ruling grounded in due process will
advance and incorporate the interests of equal protection.238 For due
process claims under Massachusetts law, the court wrote, "rational
basis analysis requires that statutes 'bear[] a real and substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of
the general welfare, ' ' 23 9 a standard consistent with rational basis with
bite.24
c. Review of the Government's Asserted Interests in Baker and
Goodridge
After determining the appropriate level of review, both the Baker
and Goodridge courts analyzed each of the governments' proffered
interests to find a rational relationship to limiting marriage to
heterosexual couples. 241 The Baker court found that denying same-sex

couples the right to marry for the purpose of furthering the link
between procreation and child-rearing was under-inclusive, given that
many heterosexual couples who marry cannot or choose not to have
children. 42 The Goodridge court agreed on this point, writing, "[tlhe
'marriage is procreation' argument singles out the one unbridgeable
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and
' and
transforms that difference into the essence of legal marriage"243

237. Id. at 948. Article I of the Massachusetts Constitution reads:
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and
unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because
of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.
Mass. Const. Pt. 1, art. I. In relevant part, Article VI provides, "[n]o man, nor
corporation, or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or
particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the community, than what
arises from the consideration of services rendered to the public." Mass. Const. Pt. 1,
art. VI.
238. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 953 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575
(2003)). Though the court's analysis primarily focused on due process, the court did
find, unlike the Lawrence Court, that the restriction on marriage did not meet rational
basis review for equal protection, as well as due process under the Massachusetts
Constitution. Id. at 961. As in Romer, the court did not consider whether strict
scrutiny was applicable based on the possibility of suspect status for sexual orientation
classifications, since the statute in question did not survive even rational basis review.
See id.
239. Id. at 960 (citation omitted).
240. See id.
241. See infra notes 242-55 and accompanying text.
242. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999).
243. Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 962.
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persons
thus like Amendment 2 in Romer "impermissibly 'identifies 244
by a single trait and denies them protection across the board.'
The Baker court also found the purpose of legitimizing children and
providing for their security through civil marriage limited to
heterosexuals to be counterproductive, given that many same-sex
couples raise children equally deserving of such protections. 4 5
Similarly, in dismissing what the Massachusetts government called an
interest in "protecting the 'optimal' child rearing unit,, 246 the
Goodridge court acknowledged the "changing realities of the
American family, ' 247 that family composition was not relevant to
successful child-rearing and, further, that "the task of child rearing for
same-sex couples is made infinitely harder by their status as outliers to
the marriage laws. "248
The Baker court similarly dismissed as unreasonable and wholly
speculative Vermont's claims that same-sex unions would encourage
marriages of convenience and otherwise unpredictably affect the
institution of marriage. 249 Although, in Goodridge, Massachusetts did
not raise these arguments, it did assert that limiting marriage
conserves scarce state and financial resources because, it alleged,
same-sex couples are less financially dependent on each other. 25" This
interest was also rejected, because the Goodridge court found that
such economic concerns had no rational relationship to excluding
same-sex couples, since the existing marriage laws "do not condition
receipt of public and private financial benefits to married individuals
on a demonstration of financial dependence" as such benefits are
provided regardless of a couple's financial arrangements.5
After assessing each of the government's asserted interests, the
Baker court concluded that the State had failed to provide a
''reasonable and just basis for the continued exclusion of same-sex
couples from the benefits incident to a civil marriage license under
Vermont law. '252 The Goodridge court went a step further in an echo
of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Romer, acknowledging in essence
244. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). The court further noted,
"the State's action confers an official stamp of approval on the destructive stereotype
that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to opposite sexrelationships and are not worthy of respect." Id.
245. Baker, 744 A.2d at 882.
246. Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 963.
247. Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000)).
248. Id.
249. Baker, 744 A.2d at 885. The court acknowledged that the State's concern may
be a plausible forecast of what is to come, but such may not serve as a reasonable
basis for the statutory exclusion. Id. Even if the State was able to provide empirical
proof to support its concerns, the court found this argument failed, not because of
lack of proof, but "failure of logic." Id. at 885 n.14.
250. Goodridge,798 N.E.2d at 964.

251. Id.
252. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886.
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that, in assessing each of the State's asserted interests, it had engaged
in pretext review:
The absence of any reasonable relationship between, on the one
hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to
enter into civil marriage and, on the other, protection of public
health, safety, or general welfare, suggests that the marriage
restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are
(or who are believed to be) homosexual. "The Constitution cannot
control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private
biases may be outside the reach of the
253 law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect.,
Though ruling under the auspices of their respective and
concededly broader state constitutions, the Baker and Goodridge
courts, in their thorough assessment of the government's asserted
interests and unwillingness to blindly defer, unlike the "interest
asserted" federal cases,254 align more closely with the Romer and
Lawrence opinions by advocating the use of rational basis with bite for
sexual orientation classifications.25 5
C. An Alternative: Acknowledging Use of Heightened Scrutiny
A few select opinions have challenged the use of rational basis with
bite-not in favor of traditional deferential review, but in favor of
acknowledging the appropriateness of applying heightened scrutiny to
sexual orientation classifications, and criticizing those who employ
to6 acknowledge their departure
rational basis with bite for failing 25
from traditional rational basis review.
1. Judge Dooley's Concurrence in Baker v. State
Concurring in Baker v. State, Judge Dooley challenged the
majority's application of any form of rational basis review and insisted
that "the rationale in federal decisions for withholding a more
searching scrutiny does not apply in Vermont. ' 257 He distinguished
253. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984) (footnote omitted)).
254. See supra Part II.A.2.
255. See supra notes 241-51 and accompanying text.
256. See infra Parts II.C.1-2.
257. Baker, 744 A.2d at 891 (Dooley, J., concurring); see also Eskridge & Hunter,
supra note 2, at 291 (noting Judge Dooley's objection to the Baker court's application
of rational basis with bite). In his concurrence in Goodridge, Judge Greaney also
found heightened scrutiny appropriate on the grounds that the restriction on marriage
amounted to both an infringement on a fundamental right and a sex-based (as
opposed to a sexual orientation-based) classification. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at
972-73 (Greaney, J., concurring). Both the due process claim that marriage is a
fundamental right and the proposition that a sexual orientation classification may be
held invalid as a sex-based classification are outside the scope of this Note. For a
discussion on marriage as a fundamental right, see generally The Ass'n of the Bar of
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Vermont from other jurisdictions which have refused to apply
heightened scrutiny based on the Supreme Court's Bowers decision,258
though good law at the time, because Vermont had long repealed its
anti-sodomy statute, and further, because Vermont had a general
policy of prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.25 9
the decision of Tanner v. Oregon
Judge Dooley then endorsed
2
Health Sciences University 60 in which the Oregon Court of Appeals

found that a classification based on sexual orientation merited
heightened scrutiny under equal protection analysis.261 Judge Dooley
considered the Oregon decision particularly applicable because, like
the Vermont Supreme Court, the Oregon Supreme Court had
adopted the federal, tiered framework for equal protection challenges
under state law (though the majority opinion in Baker chose to veer
from that framework), and both states shared similar language in the
relevant sections of their state constitutions.2 62

the City of N.Y. Comm. on Lesbian and Gay Rights, Comm. on Sex and Law, and
Comm. on Civil Rights, Report on Marriage Rights for Same-Sex Couples in New
York, 13 Colum. J. Gender & L. 70 (2004); Wendy Herdlein, Something Old,
Does the Massachusetts Constitution Provide for Same-Sex
Something New:
"Marriage"?, 12 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 137 (2002); Veronica C. Abreu, Note, The
Malleable Use of History in Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence: How the "Deeply
Rooted" Test Should Not Be a Barrier to Finding the Defense of Marriage Act
Unconstitutional Under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 44 B.C. L. Rev
177 (2002); and Kevin Aloysius Zambrowicz, Comment, "To Love and Honor All the
Days of Your Life": A Constitutional Right to Same-Sex Marriage?, 43 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 907 (1994). For a discussion on treating sexual orientation classifications as sexbased classifications, see generally Hunter, supra note 53; and Andrew Koppelman,
Why DiscriminationAgainst Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U.
L,Rev. 197 (1994).
258. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
259. Baker, 744 A.2d at 891 (Dooley, J., concurring). The Goodridge opinion also
made note of Massachusetts's "strong affirmative policy of preventing discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation" and that it too had decriminalized private
consensual adult conduct. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 967. The United States Congress
has yet to enact any such antidiscrimination legislation regarding sexual orientation;
an updated hate crimes bill that would have included sexual orientation among race,
color, religion, national origin, gender, and disability as a basis for punishment for
those who commit violent crimes based on one of the listed factors failed to pass in
2003 or 2004. See Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2004, H.R.
4204, 108th Cong. § 7(a) (2004); Local Law Enforcement Enhancement Act of 2003,
S. 966, 108th Cong. § 7(a) (2003). A proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act
that would have prohibited employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation failed to pass the Senate by one vote in 1996, and subsequent versions
have not come up for a vote in either house. See Eskridge & Hunter, supra note 2, at
1545; Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, H.R. 3285, 108th Cong. §2
(2003); Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
260. 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
261. Baker, 744 A.2d at 892-93 (Dooley, J., concurring) (discussing Tanner, 971
P.2d at 447).
262. Id. at 891-93 (citing Hewitt v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 653 P.2d 970,
976 (Or. 1982)). The relevant portion of the Oregon Constitution provides, "[n]o law
shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities,
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The Tanner court ruled on the unlawfulness of a public university's
denial of insurance benefits to domestic partners of its homosexual
employees. 263 In doing so, the court determined that suspect class
status should depend on whether the characteristic used for
classification has been "historically regarded as defining [a] distinct,
socially-recognized group[] that [has] been the subject of adverse
social or political stereotyping or prejudice" rather than focus on the
immutability of the characteristic. 26 The court then determined that
sexual orientation, like gender, race, and alienage was such a group.265
The university had insisted that benefits were available to the spouses
of all married employees-heterosexual and homosexual alike. 26 The
court responded, "[t]hat reasoning misses the point .... Homosexual
couples may not marry. Accordingly, the benefits are... made
available on terms that, for gay and lesbian couples, are a legal

impossibility. ,267

After endorsing the Tanner reasoning for applying heightened
scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications, Judge Dooley analyzed
the effects of ostensibly using rational basis review to scrutinize
governmental interests as the majority did, but in reality applying a
higher standard.2 68 Because the majority did not hold that the
restriction on marriage involved a suspect class or burdened a
fundamental right, he found that the court had "no justification for
the holding that Article 7 [of the Vermont Constitution] requires a
more activist approach than the Fourteenth Amendment for
reviewing social welfare and economic legislation. 2 69 The effect of its
activist approach, he wrote, was that "the State now bears no higher
burden to justify discrimination against African-Americans or women
than it does to justify discrimination against [any non-suspect
Fearing that the majority had encroached upon the
class]. 2 7
fundamental nature of separation of powers, he concluded,

which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." Or. Const. art. I,
§ 20; see also supra note 231 and accompanying text.
263. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 441.
264. Id. at 446.
265. Id. at 447. Though the court did not directly consider immutability, as it was
unnecessarv for its holding, it implicitly recognized sexual orientation as an innate,
self-defining trait. See id. at 446-47.
266. Id. at 447.
267. Id. at 448. The Baker concurrence and the Tanner opinion follow the line of
scholarly commentary that supports the notion that the Supreme Court may be on the
verge of finding, and ought to find, gays and lesbians to be a suspect class, should the
question eventually present itself. See supra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
268. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 894-97 (Vt. 1999) (Dooley, J., concurring).
269. Id. at 896. Judge Dooley contended that the appropriate test for a challenge
to Article 7 was the same as under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 894-95 (citing Lorrain v. Ryan, 628 A.2d 543, 550 (Vt. 1993)).
270. Id. at 894.
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I cannot endorse, in this vitally important area of constitutional
review, a standard that relies wholly on factors and balancing, with
no mooring in any criteria or guidelines, however imperfect they
may be.... [T]he balancing and weighing process set forth in the
Court's opinion describes exactly the process we would expect

facing the question before
legislators to go through if they were
27 1
us

....We

are judges, not legislators.

In his dissent in Goodridge, Judge Sosman directly stated Judge
the court has tortured
Dooley's point: "To reach the result it does,
2 72
the rational basis test beyond recognition.
2
2. Castle v. State

73

In Castle v. State, a Washington State Superior Court became the
has
only court-besides the Tanner court in Oregon 27 4-that
employed heightened scrutiny when addressing sexual orientation
classifications, this time in the context of determining the validity of
Washington State's Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA").2 7 5 Like the
Baker and Goodridge courts, the Castle court acknowledged that the
privileges or immunities clause of Washington's State Constitution
would govern rather than the comparable Federal Equal Protection
Clause.276 Although both guarantee that "persons similarly situated
with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law must receive like
treatment," the court found that the state clause may be more
protective of individual rights.2 77 Relying in part on the Tanner
opinion, because of the great similarities of the Oregon and
Washington State Constitutions and the consequent parity of Oregon
271. Id. at 897 (citations omitted).

272. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 982 (Mass. 2003)
Claiming that the Goodridge opinion represented
(Sosman, J., dissenting).
impermissibly aggressive judicial activism, one Massachusetts citizen along with a
group of Massachusetts legislators acting in their individual capacities, sued the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, alleging that its opinion "effected an
impermissible amendment of the state constitution" violating separation-of-powers
principles by redefining marriage in clear opposition to the Massachusetts
Constitution's pre-existing definition of marriage as a union between one man and
one woman. See Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court, 373 F.3d 219, 223 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 618 (2004). This state violation, in turn, violated their rights under
the Guarantee Clause of the Federal Constitution, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4, by
"depriving them of a republican form of government." Largess, 373 F.3d at 223. The
First Circuit rejected these claims, finding that the Supreme Judicial Court did not
overreach, and that the Massachusetts Constitution provides an adequate amendment
process that eliminates any threat to Massachusetts' republican form of government.
Id. at 229.
273. Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215, at *1 (Wash. Super. Ct.
Sept. 7, 2004).
274. See supra notes 260-67 and accompanying text.
275. Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *1.
276. Id. at *10.
277. Id. (citation omitted).
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and Washington jurisprudence, the Castle court held that homosexuals
constitute a suspect class requiring a higher level of scrutiny than mere
rational basis review. 78
Applying heightened scrutiny, the court found that if the state's
compelling interest is "to encourage procreation and stable
environments for children, 279 then the state DOMA sweeps too
broadly and is not narrowly tailored to such an interest, because the
statute in practice invalidates "forms of family that the community
recognizes and supports '211 through second-parent adoption2 8' and
adoption by gay individuals and couples.282 The court also found the
legislature's stated rationale-that "[i]t is a compelling interest of the
State of Washington to reaffirm its historical commitment to the
institution of marriage as a union between a man and a woman as
husband and wife and to protect that institution" - to be
insufficient.2 8 3 The court found this to be a "conclusory statement ...
devoid of any meaningful content" because a justification based on a
"historical commitment 2 84 or maintenance of the status quo could be
used to prevent any change in law.285
Implicitly acknowledging that such a due process rationale may not
suffice under an equal protection analysis, the court asked, "what
compelling interest to our community does such a historical
commitment further when compared to the fundamental intent of
equality? '286 In acknowledging that the issue of same-sex marriage
had both moral and legal components, the court observed that the
government can concern itself only with the legal.287 The court thus
distinguished the morality of the majority or that of any particular
class from "the conscience of the community" which the court felt
must prevail in a democracy where people288with different values live
together as one people and one community.

278. Id. at *11 (noting that Oregon's privileges or immunities clause which
provided the foundation for the Tanner decision was the "source clause" for
Washington's privileges or immunities clause).
279. Id. at *16.
280. Id.
281. Second-parent adoption involves an unmarried partner's adoption of his or
her partner's child(ren) without the original parent's abrogation of his or her parental
rights. For a discussion on second-parent adoption as an inroad to the rights of gay
men and lesbians to marry, see Vincent C. Green, Note, Same-Sex Adoption: An
Alternative Approach to Gay Marriagein New York, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 399 (1996).
282. Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *16.
283. Id. at *14 (citation omitted).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. (finding that any historical commitment to restricting marriage to one man
and one woman was not sufficient to override the stronger interest in equality).
287. Id. at *17.
288. Id.
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III. ADDING AND ACKNOWLEDGING THE BITE

As the disparate case law demonstrates, the Supreme Court's
failure to articulate its rational basis with bite test or outline the
circumstances in which it should be applied has led to two particular
problems in subsequent equal protection jurisprudence as applied to
sexual orientation classifications. 8 9 The first problem involves the
inconsistencies of equal protection jurisprudence among and within
the circuits that have chosen to apply traditional rational basis
review,29 thus ignoring the broader scope and intent of the Romer and
Lawrence decisions. 9 1 The second problem is that those courts that
choose to apply rational basis with bite in the spirit of Romer and
Lawrence face harsh criticism-even from those who agree with the
outcome-that they are using an amorphous form of heightened
scrutiny in the guise of rational basis.292 Such use, it is claimed,
fundamentally changes the form of the traditional standard of review
with unknown consequences for equal protection jurisprudence more
generally.29 3
This part first analyzes the consequences of the Supreme Court's
failure to articulate its rational basis with bite approach to sexual
orientation classifications as seen through a comparison of the
"interest free" and "interest asserted" cases discussed above.294 This
problem is further demonstrated by the decisions in Equality
Foundation and Limon, both of which failed to follow their respective
Supreme Court precedents of Romer and Lawrence.29 5 Finally, this
part explores how the use of rational basis with bite-that is, using
heightened scrutiny under the guise of rational basis review-subjects
from equal
such opinions to significant criticisms for departing 296
activism.
judicial
in
engaging
and
jurisprudence
protection
A. Federal Court Inconsistencies: ContradictingRomer and Lawrence
The lower courts' use of rational basis review in dealing with sexual
orientation classifications has led not only to inconsistencies among
289. The need to articulate the rational basis with bite approach stems from the
fact that Supreme Court has yet to explicitly address the issue of whether
homosexuals constitute a suspect class and the Court's consequent use of rational
basis review in the absence of answering this underlying question. See supra note 212
and accompanying text.
290. See supra Part II.A.
291. See supra Parts I.B.2-3.
292. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text; see also Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 651-52 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's opinion as
"employ[ing] a constitutional theory heretofore unknown" and having invented "a
novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine").
294. See infra notes 297-307 and accompanying text.
295. See infra notes 308-40 and accompanying text.
296. See infra Part III.B.
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and within certain circuits, but also has resulted in decisions clearly at
odds with the Supreme Court's holdings in Romer and Lawrence.29 7
For a clear example, in 1996, in Nabozny, the Seventh Circuit found
that a public school's failure to curb the harassment of a student based
298
on his sexual orientation amounted to an equal protection violation
and yet six years later, in Schroeder,the same circuit held that a public
school's failure to similarly address the concerns of a gay teacher did
not constitute discrimination. 299 The difference in outcome stems
from the government's assertion of interests in Schroeder and its
failure to do so in Nabozn. 3 °° And yet, the interests cited in
Schroeder-the school's limited resources and commensurate right to

prioritize the use of those resources-are not rationally related to the
school district's decision to adopt a laissez faire approach towards
preventing the continued harassment of the plaintiff.301 The Schroeder

court failed to distinguish a true legitimate interest in permitting
discrimination from an excuse for failing to curb it.3 2
Instead, the court focused on the school's right not to institute a
separate policy against sexual orientation discrimination.3 3 The

Schroeder court wrote, "there is no simple way of explaining to young
students why it is wrong to mock homosexuals without discussing the
underlying lifestyle or sexual behavior associated with such a
designation."30" This statement disregards that in Nabozny this same

circuit found an equal protection violation stemming from student
behavior, implicitly requiring such an explanation to prevent the
continued sexual orientation discrimination of a student facing abuse
not unlike that faced by Schroeder.3 5 Further, as the Schroeder

dissent noted, "[i]t would have been easy enough, as part of the
philosophy of 'courtesy to all' that the majority advocates, to prohibit
certain words or actions without a detailed discussion of the sexual

297. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
298. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
300. Compare supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text, with supra notes 183-87
and accompanying text (comparing the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Nabozny with its
analysis in Schroeder). Similarly, in 1997, the Sixth Circuit held that a sexual
orientation classification involving selective prosecution violated equal protection in
the absence of an asserted governmental interest, but upheld a city charter
classification in the presence of asserted interests. Compare supra notes 148-52 and
accompanying text, with supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text (comparing the
Sixth Circuit's analysis in Stemler with its analysis in Equality Foundation).
301. See Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 961 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wood,
J., dissenting). Judge Wood went so far as to openly mock the school district's
assertion of insufficient resources as a rational justification for its failure to address
the plaintiff's concerns. Id.; see supra note 224.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 954.
304. Id.
305. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 457-58 (7th Cir. 1996).
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behavior of adults," and still the school failed to do

SO.

306

Moreover,

the majority completely omitted Romer from its analysis whereas the
dissent noted that, under Romer, a state or state actors may not
"deliberately either omit altogether or give a diminished form of legal
protection from verbal or physical assaults to individuals in certain

disfavored classes."30 7 Because of its failure to apply the "more
searching" form of rational review, the Schroeder decision stands as a
direct contradiction to the holding in Romer.
Similarly inconsistent with the Supreme Court holdings in Romer
and Lawrence are the Sixth Circuit's decision in Equality

Foundation 8 and the Kansas appellate court's decision in Limon, 9
both cases remanded by the Supreme Court in light of Romer and
Lawrence respectively. 30 The Sixth Circuit, refusing to acknowledge
the import of the Romer decision, chose a very literal approach to
applying Romer in its Equality Foundation ruling by employing the
3
traditional and extremely deferential form of rational basis review. "

The Seventh Circuit, in its Nabozny opinion, even criticized the Sixth
Circuit's Equality Foundation opinion, finding that its analysis
"conflate[s]

the requirement

that discrimination

be

based

on

membership in a definable class to trigger equal protection analysis
with the requirement that the class have 'obvious, immutable, or
distinguishing characteristics' to trigger heightened or strict

'
This points to an inherent flaw in the Equality
scrutiny."3 12
Foundationholding: Article XII was not, as the court and its reliance
on Bowers implies, a classification based on homosexual conduct;
rather, it was a classification based on sexual orientation and identity,

meaning that even if one does not consider homosexuality an
immutable trait, it nonetheless is sufficient to define a class for
discriminatory or classification purposes.33
Further, the Equality Foundation court gave credence to asserted
governmental interests that the Romer court clearly deemed

306. Schroeder,282 F.3d at 960 (Wood, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 961.
308. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289
(6th Cir. 1997); see supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
309. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004), review granted, No. 0085898-AS, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 284 (Kan. May 25, 2004); see supra notes 201-11 and
accompanying text.
310. See Limon v. Kansas, 539 U.S. 955 (2003); Equal. Found. of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
311. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Clearly, that part of the Equality
Foundation opinion relying on Bowers to deny any form of heightened scrutiny to
sexual orientation classifications is no longer applicable in light of Lawrence. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,578 (2003).
312. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 457 n.10 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
313. But cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641-42 (1996) (Scalia, J.,dissenting)
(refusing to acknowledge the distinction between homosexual conduct and
homosexual orientation).
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insufficient to support a classification like that in Article XII. The
Equality Foundation court wrote that "Romer supplied no rationale
for subjecting a purely local measure of modest scope, which simply
refused special privileges under local law for a non-suspect and nonquasi-suspect group of citizens, to any equal protection assessment
other than the traditional 'rational relationship' test., 314 To the
contrary, Romer, while certainly giving credence to the broader
statewide scope of Colorado's Amendment 2, focused on the
substance of the enactment, writing that "[a] law declaring that in
general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all
others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal
protection of the laws in the most literal sense."3 5 In its failure to
apply rational basis with bite, the Sixth Circuit's opinion is a
discomforting misreading of the Romer decision.
In content, Article XII differed minimally from Amendment 2 and
consequently the Equality Foundation court should have explored the
"inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
'
animosity toward the class of persons affected."316
This "inference" is
the bite the Equality Foundationcourt refused to apply. Had it done
so, it would have dismissed the proffered interests of associational
freedom and the conservation of resources as mere pretext for
underlying animus as the Romer court had, and likely intended the
Equality Foundation court to do when it remanded the case to the
Sixth Circuit for reconsideration.3 7
The Equality Foundation case demonstrates the need for making
homosexuals a suspect class or, at minimum, better articulating the
"more searching" rational basis review to ensure that one piece of
discriminatory legislation does not stand while another is struck down.
Just as the Equality court failed to acknowledge the import of
Romer on remand from the Supreme Court, the Kansas appellate
court's resolution of Limon similarly failed to take into account the
import of Lawrence on remand. It is a well-accepted principle that the
state may not enforce facially neutral laws differently against different
segments of the population based on an arbitrary desire to

314. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,
298-99 (6th Cir. 1997).
315. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
316. Id. at 634.
317. After initially remanding the case to the Sixth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit's
subsequent ruling discussed herein, the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari with Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, writing that
the denial was not a ruling on the merits and did not reflect any interpretation as to
the proper construction of the city charter amendment; rather, Justice Stevens noted
that the Court does not normally make an independent examination of state law
questions resolved by a court of appeals. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943 (1998) (denying certiorari).
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discriminate against one group."8 Concurring in Lawrence, Justice
O'Connor emphasized this point in relation to the treatment of
homosexuals.3 19 As the dissent in Limon pointed out, Limon did not
contend that his conduct should not be punishable, but rather that the
great disparity in punishment based on the sex of the participants, and
thus his sexual orientation, violated equal protection; in other words,
the valid interest in protecting children applies regardless of the sex of
the participants.3"'
The dissent rightly found it "incomprehensible" that laws regarding
sexual conduct between minors have any rational relationship to the
state's asserted interests of advancing the family or encouraging
marriage and procreation between the victim and assailant.3"' Though
the dissent also ostensibly used rational basis review, it echoed the
"bite" implicit in the Lawrence opinion when it wrote, "[s]imply
because a majority of the legislature thinks something is immoral does
not mean it can.., be free from having that decision reviewed by the
courts.... Legislative disapproval of homosexuality alone is not
enough to justify any measures the legislature might choose to express
'
its disapproval."322
The Limon dissent, despite its logic and adherence to the spirit of
Lawrence, still has two flaws, though one not necessarily
insurmountable. Lawrence, as the majority and concurring opinions
in Limon point out, was a due process holding based on an
individual's right to privacy implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment
and thus can be distinguished from a claim grounded in equal
protection where the status of the underlying conduct is not in
question, just the classification of the participants who engage in that
conduct.323 The Lawrence majority opinion, though based on due
318. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("[Tihere is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law
which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally."); Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886); Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 874
(6th Cir. 1997).
319. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
320. State v. Limon, 83 P.3d 229, 244 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (Pierron, J., dissenting),
review granted, No. 00-85898-AS, 2004 Kan. LEXIS 284, at *1 (Kan. May 25, 2004).
The dissent reframed the issue to be whether it is constitutional that a sentence for
the commission of an identical act can be more than fifteen times as long because the
participants were of the same sex. Id. at 245.
321. Id. at 247.
322. Id. at 246.
323. See supra note 208 and accompanying text. In his concurring opinion in
Watkins v. United States Army, Judge Norris made a similar distinction finding that
the due process holding of Bowers did not apply to equal protection claims based on
sexual orientation. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Norris, J., concurring); see supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. Professor
Sunstein similarly distinguished the role of due process (protecting traditional and
historical practices and values), from the role of equal protection (serving the norm of
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process, provides implicit support for a finding that the Texas antisodomy statute also violated equal protection. First, the Lawrence
majority based its decision on the Due Process Clause rather than the
Equal Protection Clause to avoid the implication that a neutral law
prohibiting consensual adult conduct would be permissible.32 4 Had
the Court relied solely on equal protection, a state would be free to
prohibit any consensual, private sexual conduct as long as the
prohibition applied to homosexuals and heterosexuals alike.325
Second, the majority described Justice O'Connor's concurring equal
protection argument as "tenable," but chose to rely on due process
Given this
because doing so "advances both interests."32' 6
understanding, it appears that a majority of the Justices did indeed
support the notion that a law distinguishing private consensual
conduct based on sexual orientation did violate equal protection. As
such, the Limon dissent could have found reasonable support in
Lawrence to find that the Kansas statute similarly violated equal
protection, though the Lawrence majority opinion ostensibly relied
only on due process.
The less surmountable flaw of the Limon dissent is recognized in
the concurrence which found it conceivable that the perceived
increased health risks associated with homosexual activity might
justify the distinction because, in the circumstances, the participants
were not of consenting age and could not legally accept those risks.27
This flaw too would be eradicated had the Supreme Court in
Lawrence acknowledged its use of heightened scrutiny because, as the
concurrence noted, this interest in protecting minors from possible
increased health risks from homosexual activity is "tenuous" at best
and could not be considered a substantial or compelling interest that
would survive heightened scrutiny.3 28 Therefore, just as the Romer
Court's failure to acknowledge its use of heightened scrutiny led to a
contradictory holding in Equality Foundation, the Supreme Court's
failure to do so in Lawrence led to a parallel contradiction in Limon.
By continuing to use the traditional rational basis test in disregard
of the Romer and Lawrence decisions, some courts3 29 have eroded the
base-line holdings of Palmorev. Sidoti-which held that private biases

equality and expanding protection to those who are not served by a focus on history
and tradition). See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1179.
324. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 574-75.
327. Limon, 83 P.3d at 242 (Malone, J., concurring); see supra note 209 and
accompanying text. The concurrence, however, agreed with the dissent in finding
most of the interests actually asserted by the government to be irrationally related to
the classification. Limon, 83 P.3d at 242.
328. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
329. See supra Part II.A.

2005]

RATIONAL BASIS WITH BITE

2811

Department of
cannot be given credence in the law 33 -and
Agriculture v. Moreno, which held that a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot serve as a legitimate governmental
interest.3 3 Though relying on these cases, Romer and Lawrence went
further by applying these well-accepted holdings to sexual orientation
classifications, and more importantly, inferring that certain interests
asserted by the government may merely be pretextual efforts to hide
the underlying private biases of the community.332
3 34 and Limon335 courts
Justice Scalia333 and the Equality Foundation
have refused to recognize this "inevitable inference" that a
classification may be born of animosity rather than the asserted
governmental interests and, further, that such animus, even with
community approval, is not a valid or legitimate governmental interest
for so classifying.336 Protecting associational liberty and prioritizing
scarce public resources as proffered in Romer337 and Equality
3 38 and protecting the welfare of children as proffered in
Foundation,
339
Limon, are certainly legitimate governmental interests in and of
themselves. However, they cannot justify sexual orientation-based
classifications that not only are insufficiently related to these
objectives, but are imposed based on a community's general
disapproval of gay men and lesbians.

330. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("The Constitution cannot control
such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them."); see supra note 87 and
accompanying text. In Palmore, a caucasian father lost his battle to regain custody of
his child upon the remarriage of his ex-wife to a black man, claiming that rewarding
him with custody was in the best interests of the child given the stigma she would
suffer coming from an interracial home. Palmore,466 U.S. at 430-31.
331. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see supra note 98
and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 97, 126 and accompanying text. Though Palmore involved a
racial classification and consequently employed strict scrutiny, it is worth noting how
the Romer decision echoes Palmore in the manner it acknowledges the potential
legitimacy of the government's asserted interests, but then dismisses those interests in
light of the underlying presumption or inference that those interests are merely
pretext for animus. In Palmore, the Court conceded that protecting the interests of
minor children was a "duty of the highest order," but found that race was not a
permissible basis on which to uphold that duty, Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433, just as in
Romer, the Court recognized that associational liberty or conservation of scarce
resources may be legitimate interests, but not sufficiently related to the sexual
orientation-based classification, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1996).
333. See supra notes 100-02, 132-35 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 201-11 and accompanying text.
336. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634).
337. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
340. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635 ("Amendment 2... in making a general
announcement that gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from
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B. Criticisms of RationalBasis with Bite
The rational basis with bite approach as applied in cases like Baker
and Goodridge, though successful in striking down classifications
based on sexual orientation, is also unsatisfactory due to the courts'
failure to acknowledge explicitly their use of heightened scrutiny and
thereby opening up those decisions to compelling criticism.3 4' By
claiming to use rational basis review, though actually scrutinizing the

relationship between the asserted governmental interest and the
classification, these decisions "torture" traditional rational basis
review without explaining why these classifications merit less

deference.3 42

Employing heightened scrutiny under the guise of

rational basis review is circuitous and ultimately may lead to greater
resentment of bold judicial decisions3 43 by making unfounded
exceptions or modifying the appropriate standards rather than

following the court's traditional framework, however imperfect it may
be.344

As the Baker concurrence points out, such bold rational basis with
bite decisions leave future application of the traditional rational basis

review uncertain by allowing for the possibility that other traditionally
non-suspect classifications (or infringements on non-fundamental
rights) may deserve the added bite, or, conversely, that heightened
scrutiny may no longer be necessary for recognized suspect classes. 4
Additionally, such decisions become open to charges of social
favoritism. The most prominent example stems from Justice Scalia's
dissent in Lawrence in which he wrote, "[i]t is clear ... that the Court
has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring,
as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are
observed. 3 46 He added that what the Court calls "discrimination" is
the law, inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie
any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it.")
341. See supra notes 100-02, 132-35, 268-72 and accompanying text. Though both
the Baker and Goodridge courts relied on the arguably broader equal protection
counterparts of the Vermont and Massachusetts Constitutions respectively, both
courts in essence followed and cited generally accepted federal precedent in their
equal protection and due process analyses, diverging only to the extent of adding bite
to their rational basis review in line with Romer and Lawrence. See supra Part II.B.2.
By limiting their holdings to their respective state constitutions, the Baker and
Goodridge courts engaged in the type of judicial minimalism outlined by Professor
Sunstein in that the holdings avoided addressing issues (the suspect class status of
homosexuals under state or federal law and the prohibition of same-sex marriage
under federal law) that were unnecessary to their holdings and could have broader
consequences on matters beyond the issue at hand. See Sunstein, supra note 108.
342. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
343. For an extreme example, see the discussion of Largess v. Supreme Judicial
Court,supra note 272.
344. See supra notes 268-72 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
346. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Though part of
Justice Scalia's argument regarding the Court's unconventional use of rational basis
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rather the majority's right to protect themselves and their families
from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive.34 7
Justice Scalia has failed to take to heart the teachings of Palmore and
Moreno, let alone that many of the judicial victories of the civil rights
movement resulted from the discrediting of such majoritarian
morality or disapproval.348
Applying heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classificationsand acknowledging its application-solves the problem of federal
court jurisprudence inconsistent with the holdings of Romer and
Lawrence and removes the backbone of criticisms that decisions
thoroughly analyzing the asserted governmental interests are defying
traditional rational basis review. As the Baker concurrence and
Goodridge majority point out, each of their respective states had a
political climate that is anathema to status discrimination against
homosexuals based, in part, by each state having repealed their antisodomy statutes years earlier among other efforts to accommodate
"the changing realities of the American family." 349 With the
overruling of Bowers by Lawrence, the United States as a whole
moved towards more tolerance. At a minimum, Lawrence does away
with the Bowers-Padula line of reasoning, cited by Scalia in his Romer
dissent, that if a jurisdiction may criminalize homosexual conduct, it
may certainly discriminate on that basis. °
Lawrence did more than that, though. Even though the Lawrence
majority did not base its ruling on Justice O'Connor's "more
searching" review under equal protection, it characterized that
argument as "tenable" and recognized that its broader due process
holding achieved the same end, but with greater protection for

review would be rendered moot if the Court were to treat gay men and lesbians as a
suspect class, it is likely that Justice Scalia would consider even that determination as
to suspect class status part of the Court's choosing sides in the culture war.
347. Id.
348. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding Virginia's antimiscegenation statute criminalizing interracial marriage to be unconstitutional);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding the policy of "separate but
equal" to be unconstitutional and ordering the desegregation of public schools).
349. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963 (Mass. 2003) (citing
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000)); see also supra note 259 and accompanying
text.
350. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text; see also Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The courts that have relied on Bowers in
applying rational basis review to sexual orientation classifications have done so by
relying on the false premise that sodomy may be used to define the class of gay people
simply because such conduct could be legally prohibited. See Feldblum, supra note 5,
at 285. An anecdote from the Senate hearings on the military's ban on gay service
members involved Senator Strom Thurmond's adamant and loud assertions to
Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts that "[h]eterosexuals don't practice sodomy"
and Senator Kerry's attempt to educate the Senator from South Carolina to the fact
that, indeed, some heterosexuals do commit sodomy. Id. at 285-86 (citing Senators
Loudly Debate Gay Ban, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1993, at A9).
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This implicit
private, adult consensual conduct in general.3 51
endorsement indicates that Lawrence may and, in any event, should
lead to heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications just as
Reed led the way for gender classifications.352
CONCLUSION

Without a comparable holding in a federal court of appeals,
Washington State's Castle opinion-finding that gay men and lesbians
constitute a suspect class meriting heightened scrutiny and
invalidating Washington's DOMA in the absence of any compelling
government interest-currently serves as the most substantiated
holding on constitutional grounds that has thus far been issued. This
opinion should serve as a model for the numerous state and federal
courts that may soon address the validity of sexual orientation
classifications and whether gay men and lesbians constitute a suspect
or quasi-suspect class meriting some form of heightened scrutiny.353
By acknowledging that gay men and lesbians meet the requisite
factors for suspect or quasi-suspect class status and applying
heightened scrutiny,35 4 sexual orientation classifications will require
evidence of important or compelling governmental interests that are,
This
at minimum, substantially related to the classification.
acknowledgement of what the Supreme Court, in practice, has already
established will eliminate the need for the heretofore elusive,
undefined, and controversial rational basis with bite level of scrutiny.
Using similar analyses as the Baker and Goodridge majorities, but
applying heightened scrutiny, the Castle opinion acknowledges the
standards by which it renders its analysis.355 By doing so, Castle
eliminates any potential inconsistency with the Romer and Lawrence
holdings and minimizes criticism of social favoritism or judicial
activism by basing its holding on the stronger foundation of
heightened scrutiny based on the suspect or quasi-suspect status of
gay men and lesbians. Given the obstacles facing the proponents of
equal rights, contestable jurisprudence need not be one of them.

351. See Stein, supra note 103, at 274; see also supra notes 324-26 and
accompanying text.
352. Stein, supra note 103, at 282-83; see also supra notes 104-07 and accompanying
text.
353. See supra Part II.C.2.
354. See supra Part I.A.2.
355. See supra Part II.C.2.

